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TRATIVE PROCESS
FRiz MORSTEIN MARXt
LTHOUGH the subject of this paper can hardly be called trivial, it
L is interesting that no full-scale treatment of it is available. Per-
haps the reason lies in the fact that the impact of the investiga-
tive power of Congress on the executive branch tends to get lost in the
general commotion caused by the separation of powers. When there are
many devices and opportunities for recording friction and imposing cen-
sure, no one of them is very likely to stand out by itself. Even though it
may be no overstatement to say that the congressional power of inquiry
"has been a fountainhead of dissension between the executive and legisla-
tive branches,"', most studies of legislative-executive relations deal with
the investigative function as one among a considerable number of perti-
nent factors.2
A detailed analysis of congressional investigations of admnistrative
activities would be a welcome contribution. There is a great shortage of
accounts of particular phases of the legislative process, bringing together
in a systematic way the rich but scattered supply of case materials. A
comprehensive study of the investigative method in its application to the
executive branch may be expected to cast additional light on the inter-
meshing of the legislative and the administrative processes; on the degree
to which this intermeshing is governed in its characteristics by the chang-
ing circumstances of our national life and by the balance of personalities;
and on the corresponding changes in the use to which the investigative
power is put in any given period.3
t Adjunct professor of political science, American University; editor, Elements of Public
Administration (1946); author, The President and His Staff Services (1947).
1 These are the words of an able member of the United States Senate. Ives, In Place of
Congressional "Circuses," N.Y. Times Magazine 20 (Aug. 20, 1950).
Consult, e.g., Key, Legislative Control, in Elements of Public Administration 339
(Morstein Marx ed., 1946).
3 These conclusions are suggested in an appraisal of the investigative power based largely
on the evidence of the thirties. McGeary, The Developments of Congressional Investigative
Power (I94O).
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Needless to say this kind of study would require the space of a mono-
graph, and possibly of several. Nothing like that could be attempted here.
Instead it is proposed to present in a rather general way three aspects of
the topic: (i) the need for facts in governmental action and the role of
the investigative function in meeting this need; (2) the operation of the
investigative power in relation to administrative responsibility; and (3)
the operation of the investigative power in relation to legislative respon-
sibility.
Administrative Means of Getting at the Facts
One of the common features of contemporary government throughout
the world is the continuing expansion of public functions. To some, this
tendency bespeaks the inevitable demise of free society. To others, the
widening scope of governmental responsibility is the only means by which
free society can be made both reasonably secure and tangibly meaningful
to the great body of citizens. Whatever the point of view, when govern-
ment comes to affect individual and group enterprise in so many ways,
it cannot afford to act blindly. It must inform itself in sufficient detail
not only of social, economic, scientific and technological developments
but also of the effects of its own actions upon these developments. Thus,
by sheer necessity, as governmental responsibilities increase, a broadly
corresponding growth occurs in what may be called the government's
intelligence functiona-the organized collection and evaluation of count-
less facts and figures, including such widely different matters as the rela-
tionship between taxation and private investment, the weaning habits of
mothers, the spread of forest pests and the behavior of cirrus clouds.
Two facts alone would demonstrate the growth of the government's
intelligence function during the past half-century. The first is the striking
increase within the civil service of men and women trained for the pro-
fessions. The second is the no less noticeable sprouting of staff units, in
individual agencies as well as on the level of the Chief Executive, which
are occupied with the sifting and weighing of data for use in policy deci-
sions. A large part of these data accrue as a by-product of the administra-
tive process. Another part flows to individual agencies from the public in
response to official inquiriesfs The large mass of governmental publications
41 have used this term previously (as have others). Morstein Marx, The Social Function
of Public Administration, in Elements of Public Administration 98, ix4-I5 (Morstein Marx
ed., 1946).
5 In the federal government the Federal Reports Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 1078 (1942), 5
U.S.C.A. § i39(a) (Supp., 1949), requires the approval of such inquiries by the Bureau of
the Budget, which acts as the President's staff agency for matters of general management in
order to obtain co-ordination and to keep to a minimum the burden on the public.
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by which needed specialized knowledge is furnished to various parts of
the public and the advance of government research to a billion-dollar
enterprise are also indicative of the growth of the government's intelli-
gence function.
In other words, the "service state"6 of today is not only "big govern-
ment" but also better-informed government. Of course, just as military
intelligence is capable of fateful blunders, so better-informed government
does not mean wise government. But there is little doubt that the vol-
ume of factual information at the command of present-day government
is vastly larger than it was at the turn of the century. And because much
of this information accumulates automatically in the work of adminis-
trative agencies, the executive branch has become a prime source of spe-
cial knowledge on every subject of interest to government.
Legislative Means of Getting at the Facts
In some respects, legislators build up a store of essential information
in very much the same way as do administrative agencies. Committee
service, especially when it continues for some time, makes many a mem-
ber into something of an expert. But lawmakers usually lack effective
means of organizing for themselves the kind of machinery for reference
that in administrative agencies is provided by planning units on the one
hand and by library and record staffs on the other. In addition, there is
the relentless pressure of time. Administrative officials suffer from it too,
but they generally know how to make the most of constant briefing by
subordinates, who are able to summarize the steady flow of departmental
intelligence. Members of Congress do not have at their disposal a com-
parable briefing service, and they are often disinclined to become depend-
ent on such staff assistance as is available to them.7 They absorb much
of their knowledge by ear.
However, organized staff work on the legislative level has recently
made great progress, in particular as a consequence of the Legislative Re-
6 The trend "toward the service state," in the words of a recognized authority, became
conspicuous in the administrative evolution in the United States during the first three dec-
ades of the present century. White, Trends in Public Administration 341 (1933).
7In this matter, legislators, quite naturally, reflect their own earlier occupational back-
grounds. Much of the country's recruitment for political functions is from among men and
women who are accustomed to do nearly all of their work by themselves. Hence, members of
Congress often find it diifficult to use a professionally trained staff, quite aside from establish-
ing relationships of confidence in a business in which confidence is highly valued. Not a few
legislators are given to speaking skeptically of the "waste of overstaffing." The staff group
built up in his office on his own initiative by Senator Herbert H. Lehman of New York is a
very exceptional thing.
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organization Act of 1946.8 The Legislative Reference Service in the Li-
brary of Congress has succeeded in assembling an able body of specialists
in different fields, whose work has further strengthened the government's
intelligence function. Committee staffs and personal staff assistance to in-
dividual legislators have contributed to placing legislation on a sounder
basis.9 As a result, Congress is now better equipped than it was before to
appraise independently the information proffered by interest groups and
lobbies or presented to it in reports and testimony under auspices of the
executive branch.
Staff development in Congress obviously is not intended to duplicate
staff work done in the administrative agencies. Rather, congressional
staffs are to enable legislators to test and use for their own purposes the
information that is at their beck and call in the executive branch. The
role of the presidency as a source of proposed programs of government
action, submitted for consideration by Congress, is not being minimized.
This role, alluded to in the Constitution, was first defined in specific
terms by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,10 which charged the
President with the preparation for use by Congress of the budget-an an-
nual comprehensive work plan for the federal government as a whole. At
the same time that the Legislative Reorganization Act gave added im-
petus to congressional staffing, the Employment Act of 1946 broadened
the President's function of program recommendation by making it his
duty to lay before Congress an annual economic report."r
One incidental but important benefit of better congressional staffing is
the marked increase in informal contacts between the legislative and the
executive branches. A member of Congress, especially if he does not be-
long to the party of the President, may often find it inopportune to pre-
vail upon an administrative agency for information he needs. A staff spe-
cialist in his office, talking to a professional colleague in the agency, is less
inconvenienced by political distance. He may see his counterpart on the
8 6o Stat. 812, 834 (1946), 2 U.S.C.A. § 72a (Supp., i95o).
9 It should not be assumed that the relationships between old-line committee clerks and
the members of the legislator's intimate entourage on the one hand and the professionally
trained newcomers on the other are always close or cordial. Nor should it be assumed that
problems in this area are unknown in the administrative agencies. The increased supply of
professional staff assistance in government has not generally been accompanied by correspond-
ing experience in the best use of available staff resources.
10 42 Stat. 2o (I92i), 31 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1927).
i 6o Stat. 24 (1946), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1022 (1948). All three of the principal annual messages
of the President follow each other closely at the opening of the regular session of Congress:
the State of the Union message, the economic report and the budget message accompanied
by the budget document.
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administrative side in the activities of professional associations to which
both are likely to belong. Free exchange on the staff level yields mutual
returns in useful knowledge. Moreover, the professional bond in many in-
stances may prove stronger than the pull of institutional location. On ei-
ther side of the constitutional fence, professional staff members will appre-
ciate the delicacies of informal exchange of information, but in a large
number of cases no such delicacies are involved. It is then simply a matter
of being helpful in sharing data that happen to be available at one or an-
other place. Nor is there any collusion about this process, because it could
not go on without a measure of encouragement a step above.1 2
As contemporary government is better-informed government, so Con-
gress today has substantially more information at its service than it had a
few decades ago. A special pleader intent upon misleading a legislative
committee in matters of fact would be on a difficult and risky errand. An
administrative official embarking upon such a venture would know that
few in his own agency could be trusted to grant him extenuating circum-
stances. There is so much competition for the ear of Congress and so much
enlargement of its auditory mechanism that nobody can hope to turn the
legislative mind this way or that way simply by some adroit mauling of
facts. Congress has greatly reinforced itself against falling prey to misin-
formation.
Agencies as Targets
Administrative agencies, in particular, know that even an occasional
fib may carry with it drastic penalty. Appropriations committees make
short work of an agency they find unworthy of their confidence. Legisla-
tive proposals in which the agency is vitally interested may not get any-
where if the committee dealing with the subject thinks little of the agen-
cy's veracity.' 3 The weight of emphasis in the conduct of all administra-
tive business is definitely on the side of being on the best of terms with
Congress, especially the committees closest to the agency's concerns, in-
cluding particular members of great influence and even committee clerks.
Hence when the President, looking at the affairs of the nation in the large,
feels it necessary or desirable to fling a challenge at the legislative body,
administrative agencies, preoccupied with their long-range programs, are
12 Staff collaboration between the legislative and the executive branches may also be on a
more formal basis, especially at the instance of a congressional committee working on im-
portant legislative proposals, including those not expressly sponsored by the executive branch.
"3 Legislative measures originating within the executive branch as well as all proposed
executive orders must be cleared for the President by the Bureau of the Budget.
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more likely than not to cringe at the thought of battle. Getting along with
Congress is a motto so plainly inscribed above administrative portals
that being "good" in the eyes of the most immediately influential law-
makers becomes almost second nature. It is not being argued here that
being "good" in this sense coincides always with the pursuit of the public
interest.
Formal investigative action by Congress, in short, is but one arrow in
the well-stocked quiver of legislative surveillance over administrative con-
duct. The curious, no doubt, might like to know just what prompts the
archer to pick one arrow in preference to others. Of course, there is no sin-
gle answer. But one thing can be said generally. Formal investigative ac-
tion, in the nature of the process, always buys a larger public audience
than even the most merciless grilling and spanking of administrative offi-
cials before a subcommittee of the House or Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee.' 4 A larger public audience may be deemed beneficial when it is
hoped to mobilize public opinion for administrative reforms. But news-
paper headlines are also bread and butter for members of Congress eager
to advance their personal standing. Although depending ultimately on the
state of public thinking if not on his own sense of responsibility, it may be
very profitable for a legislator, in a time of deeply felt international ten-
sion, to call for an investigation of treasonable influences in as many
agencies as he might find listed in the United States Government Manual.
Perhaps more properly, in a time of national emergency, lawmakers will
see reasons for investigating such aspects of the governmental defense
effort as may seem to be in need of scrutiny before the grandstand of the
nation.*
Not surprisingly, the arrow of investigation may be placed into the
bow or pushed back into the quiver by hands other than those of the
archer. When there is a high degree of accord between Congress and the
President, he or some of the departments will not encounter insurmount-
able obstacles in co-ordinating the investigative power with the goals of
the political program. 5 The findings of a legislative inquiry can help to
* Consult Cook, Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, page 634 infra.
'4 The publicity aspect of congressional investigations and the undesirable consequences
inseparable from it are stressed in Glassie and Cooley, Congressional Investigations-Salva-
tion in Self Regulation, 38 Geo. L.J. 343 (195o).
X5 For some comment on this point and the evidence of the thirties, consult McGeary,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 34 et seq. The general condition referred to in the text is far from
common. On the other hand, obviously no department is coldly neutral when a congres-
sional investigation either sits on its neck or conversely appears to bolster the department's
position by sympathetic moves. In the first case the department will try to corral its friends
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build up public sentiment for governmental action favored by the Presi-
dent. Or, when there is a high degree of accord between a congressional
committee on the one side and a particular agency or an intransigent fac-
tion within an agency on the other, it is within the realm of possibility
that the investigative power comes to the fore as the protector of friends
and the scourge of foes. Of course, it is an old story that regulation and
promotion live close together. Agencies adept at being "good" may earn
more than ordinary rewards from the controlling committee by their skill
and devotion.
The Theory of Administrative Responsibility
In a democratic society, it is a matter of principle that administrative
agencies must answer for their plans and actions. Accountability keeps the
public services from turning into a self-willed bureaucracy. The prime
means of achieving accountability is a unified executive branch whose
head comes into office by the electorate's decision. As Chief Executive, he
secures administrative accountability through his power of direction, thus
assuming responsibility before the legislative body as well as the voters.
That, in a nutshell, is the constitutional theory of public administra-
tion. The practice looks different in many ways. The legislative body too
often seems to vanish behind the actions of its committees. The Chief Ex-
ecutive too often seems to lack effective discipline over his subordinates.
Time and again the legislative and the executive branches seem to give
way to power combinations formed by particular interest groups with an
individual committee on the one side and its departmental counterpart
on the other. Thus it becomes practically impossible for the Chief Execu-
tive to carry out his responsibility to the legislature and the electorate. 6
The result is not an inevitable consequence of the separation of powers.
Even though the legislative and the executive powers are divided, respon-
sible government requires a considerable degree of co-operation between
them. The necessary link can only be provided by a properly organized
party system. We do not possess such a party system now.
Short of such a party system, legislative-executive relations tear apart
into a thousand separate cross-connections. The department head may
spend more time keeping his congressional fences in good repair than fol-
in and out of Congress. In the second case the department will help wherever it can. See also
McGeary, Historical Development, page 425 supra.
x6 For fuller discussion, consult Price, Democratic Administration, in Elements of Public
Administration 72, especially at 78 (Morstein Marx ed., 1946); Leiserson, Political Limi-
tations on Executive Reorganization, 41 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 68 (1947).
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lowing the wishes of the President. The bureau chief, with backing from a
legislative committee, may let things go with barest allegiance to depart-
mental policy. Congressional committees, in turn, may go their own ways.
The relationships between Congress as a whole and the President become
part of a badly tangled web.
Difficulty of Internal Control in Congress
Senator Irving M. Ives of New York has recently called the investiga-
tive function "one of Congress' most valuable legislative aids."' 7 This ap-
praisal is not likely to arouse dissent, for a legislature without power to
probe and inquire is like a reed which any breeze can bend. It is an entirely
different question, however, whether Congress is so constituted as to give
institutional direction to the exercise of the investigative function.
Unfortunately, Congress has no reliable machinery for asserting its own
institutional position in its internal operations. There is no committee on
the legislative program. The nearest approximation is the joint Commit-
tee on the Economic Report, created by the Employment Act of 1946 to
consider the President's economic reports and to make recommendations
on economic policy for the benefit of the working committees in each
house. 8 But the relationships between the Joint Committee and other
committees have continued to be rather tenuous; as things stand, it would
be a miracle if it were otherwise. Another approximation of a committee
on the legislative program might perhaps be seen in the appropriations
committees acting on the government's annual work plan submitted in the
form of the President's budget. But it is precisely as sources of general
legislative policy that the appropriations committees have made their
least conspicuous contribution.' 9 The reasons, again, are obvious.
Realists-those who know only yesterday-will probably laugh off the
very idea of a committee on the legislative program. In the context of cur-
rent congressional practice the idea seems preposterous indeed. But the
idea supplies a good vantage point to spot the faulty deployment of legis-
lative strength. With almost nothing at hand to bring Congress as a whole
to bear upon its internal operations, the institutional position of the legis-
lature is manipulated by freely congregating majorities without durable
bonds, defined working agreements, or a broader purpose. This spectacle
17 Ives, op. cit. supra note i. Consult Fulbright, Significance for the Legislative Process
page 440 supra.
18 6o Stat. 25 (x946), i5 U.S.C.A. § 1024 (1948).
'9 For an informative recent case study with respect to the country's military policies,
consult Huzar, The Purse and the Sword (1950).
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one might call the technique of informal or unbound coalition, cutting
straight through party lines. Such coalitions, mindless of party labels, are
far too fluid to serve as organizers of Congress, but they are likely to be-
come possessed with their own sense of political convenience.
As organizers of Congress the parties fall quite short of satisfactory per-
formance. Without a democratically developed and hence generally ac-
cepted party program to govern each party's plan of operations in the leg-
islature, party-policy committees face formidable roadblocks in giving
guidance for concerted action. Caucus decisions become pious pro-
nouncements when they cannot pretend to be in the nature of tactical
implementation of common party strategy. Left very much on their own
resources, members of Congress find it difficult to set general policy against
the special interests that press upon them through their local constituen-
cies. The representative's vaunted independence of conscience, so greatly
fostered by looseness of congressional party organization, thus constantly
invites dependence on organized external forces which seek to lead him
by the hand. These forces, by and large, view all general policy with mis-
givings, for the simple reason that special objectives have freer play when
the restraining influence of general ends is not felt.
The Utility of Investigation of Administrative Behavior
Under these circumstances it would be a sad thing if the investigative
power of Congress were actually "the strongest weapon against corrup-
tion in executive departments."'2 But perhaps the phrase is ambiguous.
Certainly when administrators are able to slam the door in the face of a
legislature anxious to inspect the dirty linen hidden somewhere, bureau-
cratic self-sufficiency and even fiscal laxity will have a favorable climate.
The right of Congress to inform itself about administrative conduct is an
important right. One may grant readily that awareness by administrative
agencies of the very presence of this right will have a wholesome effect,
even though it is not easy to measure the effect in concrete terms.
On the other hand, suspicion of corruption in the usual sense of the word
is today a very small worry in the attitude of Congress toward the execu-
tive branch, if one may judge by the contents of the Congressional Rec-
ord.2  Administrative ethics have their roots far less in fear of disclosure
2o Glassie and Cooley, op. cit. supra note 14, at 345. The authors suggest that executive
departments are "notoriously lax in policing themselves." Ibid. Perhaps they detract from
this contention unintentionally by citing as supporting evidence one reference to the daily
output of a Washington columnist (Drew Pearson).
21 That there is increasingly less ground for such worry is also indicated in the annual re-
ports of the Comptroller General.
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and punishment than in professional outlook and a philosophy of service. 2
In a career establishment, those who seek personal enrichment by reaching
around legal prohibitions know that they must reckon with the hostility
of all of their professional associates. This is much more discouraging to
peculation than the possibility of detection by congressional investigation.
When the decision to shoot the arrow of investigation is seldom the out-
come of an institutional position taken by Congress as a whole in further-
ance of its legislative goals; when the relationship of this decision to the
legislative program often finds little attention on the floor; when the deci-
sion, for all practical purposes, may be that of only a few members who are
neither the best spokesmen for their respective parties nor the voice of Con-
gress at large--then it is very hard to correlate the aims of the investiga-
tion with administrative responsibility. Executive officials, far from feel-
ing properly chastised, either are aroused to moral fervor or fatalistically
bemoan the evil gale as something beyond point and purpose. In these re-
sponses they may in fact get not a little support from good friends in Con-
gress, who sometimes do not mind holding hands with the administrative
underdog in public while the rumpus goes on. Conversely, the prime mov-
ers of the congressional investigation may get many a cue by courtesy of
political friends within the administrative agency that is being investi-
gated. With so much perfection in government statistics, it is too bad
that statistical data on these matters are lacking.
At least one legal problem arising in this area is aggravated by weak in-
stitutional control over congressional investigators: the privilege occasion-
ally claimed by the executive branch in refusing to submit documents and
other papers to a congressional committee.* The state of law is perhaps
adequately described by saying that the controversies over this privilege
are "unresolved. '1 3 And well might they so remain. For it is rather ob-
vious that nobody likes to put his head into the mouth of a highly tem-
peramental lion. But it would be wrong to assume that the claim of privi-
lege with regard to administrative records stems only from the natural
urge of self-protection. There is also fear on the part of officials with a
strong sense of responsibility that surrender of certain kinds of docu-
* Consult McGeary, Historical Development, page 425 supra.
For further discussion, consult Morstein Marx, Administrative Ethics and the Rule of
Law, 43 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. izig (1949).
23 Glassie and Cooley, op. cit. supra note 14, at 353 n. 41. A defense of the privilege to
withhold documents is offered in Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for
Executive Papers, io Fed. Bar J. io 3 (1949). See also Government Privilege against Disclosure
of Official Documents, 58 Yale L.J. 993 (z949); Discovery' of Government Documents under
the Federal Rules, i8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 122 (1950).
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ments to congressional probers may be equal to public disclosure. Here,
once more, the weakness of control in Congress is a potent consideration.
Variety of Motives for 1nvestigations
If it did not play havoc with language, one might divide the motives
for congressional investigations of administrative conduct into those which
are objective and those which are subjective. The objective ones would
relate to general public ends-to stop mismanagement; to overcome lag-
gard attention to important programs; to show up conditions in adminis-
tration that might need organizational or procedural reform; to cause an
agency to do the right thing, as the sponsors of the investigation conceive
it; to expose weak departmental leadership; to look into matters of fiscal
propriety; or simply to cut down some people who seem to be getting too
big for their breeches.
The subjective motives run on a different scale; they relate to special
personal ends. For instance, a lawmaker may be eager for a chance of get-
ting even with an administrator he happens to detest. Or an investigation
may soften up an agency that has refused to play ball with a particular
interest with which the legislator sees very much eye to eye. Or, for simi-
lar reasons, he may hope to knock some teeth out of the law which the
agency is enforcing. Then too, re-election may be around the corner, and
he may feel that his estate in Congress needs a boost. As one student of the
subject observes, "perhaps no swifter escalator to national prominence"
exists "than the direction of an important inquiry. '24
The motives here called objective -and subjective keep close company
with one another. The objective ones provide a protective shield for the
subjective ones. The individual legislator, indeed, may not be able fully
to account for the diversity of motives. He shares this difficulty with other
mortals, and his difficulty is made greater by the fact of his elevation on the
political stage.2- It is natural for him to be concerned with all of the effects
of the particular investigation, including those affecting his own political
fortunes in apersonalway. When membership in a legislativebodyisahighiy
individualized business, it is not astonishing that personal considerations
gain an emphasis which is out of proportion to public ends. It is easy to
pass disdainful moral judgment, but it is much harder to put such judg-
ment on a secure institutional foundation. The only hope for a practical
'4 McGeary, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11g. Consult Voorhis, Inner Workings, page 455 supra.
'5 The range of pertinent factors is explored with great skill in Lasswell, Psychopathology
and Politics (xg3o). Subsequent amplification by others has not carried the matter much be-
yond this study.
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check on excessive concern with personal interest lies in reinforcement of
institutional arrangements designed to increase the weight of public pur-
poses.
Lack of Commonly Accepted Institutional Objectives
It has been suggested earlier that because of the present condition of
the party system there is a marked deficiency of internal congressional
authority. This deficiency, as might be expected, hampers the legislative
body in committing itself to the pursuit of commonly accepted institu-
tional objectives. Administrators who set out to live by the word of Con-
gress are bound to discover to their dismay that the word of Congress is in
fact many words, with little synchronization of voices. As a result, when
administrative officials do right by some voices they are likely to do quite
wrong by others .2
What happens when- legislative concern with administrative perform-
ance lacks general orientation? One answer was given recently by a
thoughtful member of Congress, who brought himself to the reluctant con-
clusion that "since World War II Congressional probes have slipped to a
new all-time low in public disfavor. ' '27 Perhaps this suggestion is unduly
influenced by fresh instances painfully remembered. At least it appears
quite possible that careful historical analysis might reassure us on an
equally uncomfortable past. Be that as it may, there is undoubtedly
room for the question of the origin of an unsatisfactory state. On this
point, our legislative authority says, "[T]he chief cause of the general dis-
repute into which Congressional inquiries have fallen ... is the fact that
the Congress itself has allowed serious abuses to permeate the entire in-
vestigative process.
' '
12
Not a few other astute observers in and out of Congress have fixed the
blame in the same manner. But such an allocation of responsibility has a
somewhat artificial touch. For what is Congress when spoken of as an
agency that allows or disallows? Congress appears here as the equivalent
of the man who wasn't there. The abuses it is charged with allowing are
abuses that flourish because of congressional incapacity for policing itself.
In the light of the preceding discussion, that incapacity cannot be under-
stood as the kind of sloppy disregard of consequences which to moralists
is the mark of weak character. Incapacity for self-policing is but one mani-
26 For a retracing of these difficulties in a critical area of public policy, consult Dali, Con-
gress and Foreign Policy (ig5o); McCamy, The Administration of American Foreign Affairs
(I9so).
27 Ives, op. cit. supra note 1. 28 Ibid.
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festation of the difficulty which confronts Congress in attaining the neces-
sary degree of institutional identity, of being Congress rather than so
many senators and so many representatives.
The matter would not be worth mention if the difference in congres-
sional anticipation were only a necessary part of that honorable theorem
which places responsibility for government on the one side and responsi-
bility for opposition on the other. In a diversified society, the necessary
degree of consent in support of public policy must be hammered out in
free competition of interests and ideas. No course of policy is ever sancti-
fied as the only one. Disagreements yield to make room for consent, but
they do not disappear. Like watchful dogs, they stay around the yard.
The organized expression of such disagreements is the essential job of the
political opposition. The opposition is not there just to bark; it is there to
bite, too. In bark and bite the opposition is vital to resourceful and respon-
sible government. Administrators who know their place in the political
system never have reason to complain about the bark and bite of a re-
sponsible opposition.
But a responsible opposition is one of party unified by program. The
effects of opposition on administrative conduct are vastly different when
the negative is carried by a loose conglomeration of lawmakers whose
agreements do not far exceed those one might discover among the cus-
tomers of a chain store. Moreover, when this is the state of opposition, the
legislative majority is also apt to be quite heterogeneous. Administrators
who like to look upon Congress as a board of directors are then driven to
the awkward conclusion that the board of directors has been replaced by
a stockholders' meeting.
Add now another problem-the gulf a legislator has to ferry across in
seeking to understand the technical intricacies of the administrative proc-
ess. Individual members of Congress, it is true, may gain much informa-
tion about it, if their interests so prompt them. But the down-to-earth
skepticism toward all experts which flowers in Congress is not sympa-
thetic even to the deliberate use of congressional expertise. In organizing
an investigation of administrative activities, little importance is usually
attached to the question of the individual member's special knowledge of
administrative organization and procedure. Perhaps a case can be made
for intentional choice of members who will showkeener curiosity and sharp-
er grasp just because their minds are not dulled by familiarity with the
methods of conducting administrative business.
In any event, both in point of view and in yardstick of measurement
legislators and administrators tend to stand apart when they try to come to
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judgments in detail about what an agency ought to do and what not, and
how it ought to do it and how not. To some extent, these differences are
the contrasts one might expect to find between the accused and the ac-
cuser. But that is considerably less than the whole story. There is also the
great difference between the occupational worlds of legislators and ad-
ministrators,29 besides the obvious difference between the backseat driver
and the one who faces the traffic behind the steering wheel.
The influence of these differences upon congressional investigations of
administrative conduct can be reduced in great measure when the legis-
lative body reflects a reasonably well consolidated point of view toward the
administrative function. Then the exercise of the investigative power can
be held more closely to commonly accepted institutional objectives of the
legislative branch. Then congressional surveillance over the executive
branch is kept more easily on the track of constructive effort. Then the
results may be expected to redound more often to the good of administra-
tion.
There has never been a dearth of helpful proposals to press the exercise
of the investigative power into a procedural mold.30 Nobody would want
to minimize the unquestionable value of orderly procedure in the handling
of public business. Nobody would seriously doubt the need for procedural
safeguards in the investigative process not only of crucial individual rights
but also of effective fact-finding in general. But when everything is said
and done, one is still left face-to-face with the condition of internal organi-
zation in the legislative body, which, it is being submitted here, is equal
to the condition of congressional party organization. justice, lawyers tell
us, is the product of both judicial procedure and judicial temperament.
Similarly, what we need in congressional investigations is both respectable
processes and an attitude that places general public ends above special
personal ends. This kind of focus does not emerge unless the parties suc-
ceed in bringing forth programs that gain recognition among the con-
gressional party membership as common plans for the attainment of gen-
eral public ends.
Decreasing Importance of Investigating Administrative Conduct
Short of a reformation of the party system, which cannot be said to be
in immediate prospect, congressional inquiries into the business of the
29 Leiserson's observations on the differences between Congress and the executive branch
with respect to administrative reorganization are very much to the point in connection with
the problem here referred to. Leiserson, op. cit. supra note i6.
30 Some of these proposals of more recent vintage may be found in Glassie and Cooley,
op. cit. supra note 14. Consult Galloway, Proposed Reforms, page 478 supra.
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executive branch appear likely to become less important as means of
achieving accountability or of raising the standards of administration.
This does not mean that investigations will be less frequent. Nor does it
mean that the investigative function will lbse importance as a source of
harassment to the President as well as administrative officials or as a de-
vice to be manipulated for various ends in the great game of politics.
By and large, when administrative systems mature they likewise tend
to acquire greater transparency, making it easier for outsiders to pene-
trate a defensive curtain of artificial fog.3 Another factor, as was indi-
cated earlier, is the freer flow of information from administrative agencies
to congressional committees as a result of legislative staffing. If there is
something to be explained on higher authority, a telephone call from the
chairman of any of the standing committees of Congress will cause the
head of even the busiest department to scurry to "the Hill." What is
more significant still, in most instances the needed explanation can be
produced on such short notice, and the department head is free to scamper
back to his desk after a few hours of interrogation, feeling a great deal
better than when the summons came.
In addition, it is very probable that members of Congress will continue
to feel less than confident in trying to tell administrators how to solve
administrative problems. One recent illustration was the establishment
by legislation of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, popularly known as the Hoover Commission. This
large-scale inquiry, under joint congressional-executive-public auspices
but very much headed by a knowledgeable former President, kept itself
at quite a distance from the political bargain counter and rather close to
the facts. Thus the Commission managed to complete its assignment with-
out giving anybody a chance to make personal capital of its findings and
recommendations.
The contribution made by the Hoover Commission is significant for our
subject from yet another angle. With administrative accountability regu-
larly achieved by a variety of internal and external controls, there is cor-
respondingly greater need for forward-looking inquiries than for back-
ward-looking ones. As has been pointed out by students of the power of
inquiry, investigations "have the same shortcomings as annual reports
3S As one aspect of the matter, it might be well to mention the progress made during the
past decade in the methods of record management, which has drawn needed attention to
the role documentation should play in the administrative process. A recent legislative ap-
proach to the subject is the Federal Records Act of xg5o, 64 Stat. 583 (1950), 4x U.S.C.A.
§ 281 (Supp., ig5r).
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and appropriation hearings-they come too late. '32 At least they come
after the event. The reference sometimes made in this context to British
royal commissions 33 suggests the advantages to be expected from pointing
the investigative function as often into the future as into the past. For
such purposes the precedent of the Hoover Commission may invite or-
ganizational arrangements quite different from the usual investigating
committee of Congress.
Investigations during the Emergency Period
The point was made earlier that there is a special place for the investi-
gative function in periods when the government is called upon to enlarge
its traditional structure with great rapidity and when government orders
for all kinds of products pour all over the economy. In the current emer-
gency, again, this kind of continuous congressional vigilance, so well
remembered from the work of the Truman Committee in World War II,
may come to assume new importance.* Such investigative effort, how-
ever, requires for its greatest effectiveness both considerable restraint on
the side of publicity and self-glorification and much interplay with the
agencies of the executive branch.
It has already been suggested that congressional investigations of ad-
ministrative conduct on the familiar model might not become less fre-
quent. As a matter of fact, when the nation is faced with adversity, legis-
lative tempers flare on small provocation. This is merely the other side
of the coin of political individualism in the congressional arena. There is
no reason to expect a lack of investigative sideshows, all things remaining
equal. But, temporarily at least, some factors will conceivably exert a
dampening influence.
One of these, and perhaps the most important, is the informal embargo
on excessive partisanship imposed by the stern demands of national
crisis. 'When it comes to saving our skins we are all walking exhibits of
bipartisanship. If past experience can be trusted to furnish guidance,
even the executive branch is likely to turn bipartisan in many a corner.
The presence of an emergency is likely to result in at least partial cessation
of interparty hostilities. To the extent the investigative power is used as a
weapon in this conflict, its use will diminish accordingly. 34
* Consult Cook, Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, page 634 infra.
32Dimock and Dimock, American Government in Action 392 (1946). For a preceding
special study, which has retained its place in the literature, consult Dimock, Congressional
Investigating Committees (1929).
33 Dimock and Dimock, American Government in Action 392 (1946).
34 But it is not a peculiarly American phenomenon, of course. Interparty truces or all-
inclusive coalitions in times of dire emergency are common experiences even in countries
with a multiparty tradition.
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Another very tangible possibility is an investigative monopoly success-
fully claimed by a single committee to exercise oversight with respect to all
emergency activities. A committee of this kind, to repeat, tends to acquire
characteristics of its own, setting it apart from the garden variety of in-
vestigation. Members of Congress, out of their own personal sense of
responsibility, find it desirable on the whole to defer to a general com-
mittee of inquiry if the committee appears to be in competent hands.
One final factor is the matter of security requirements, real and
imagined. The inevitable effect of such requirements is the containment
of information. In this matter, the executive branch has something of an
upper hand. The operative arm of government is closer to the point of ac-
tion; it can therefore speak with an air of authority on what security
requirements must be maintained in the interest of effective action. In
the name of security it may keep even members of Congress at arm's
length, feeling righteously that it must.
Likely Effects of a Stronger Party System
These speculations about the future are, one would hope, of a short-
range character. What of the long-range development? After all that has
been said thus far, the reader will be prepared for the conclusion that tech-
nical improvements in the organization and procedure of investigative ac-
tion, though highly desirable, may not accomplish much. They hold little
promise to change the essence of the thing, which is the state of internal
congressional structure, or, still more specifically, the state of party man-
agement in the legislative body.
The question then is: What can be done to change the state of party
management in Congress? This question, in turn, is tied up with the
larger one of party organization in general. One answer has recently been
outlined by a group of political scientists, who explored the subject for
several years.3 s To put it in one paragraph is almost impossible, because
political scientists seem to be allergic to brief answers. But the matter
comes down to a set of proposals, for the most part within the range of
autonomous action by both major parties, to increase their ability to act
as parties in national terms. Suppose the membership of each party
formed something like a partnership for accomplishing the commitments
of the party program; suppose the members, as a rule, felt an obligation
to the party by which they designate themselves politically; suppose to
investigate or not to investigate were a matter of party decision--with
35 Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, Toward
a More Responsible Two-Party System (ig5o). This report is also available as a supplement
to the September issue, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. (zg5o).
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these conditions present there would be a steady hand to bring the in-
vestigative power to bear upon administration. Then the congressional
majority, whether or not of the President's party, would be able to pro-
ceed on a line of consistency in relation to the party program. Then the
majority could convey its position to the executive branch in a clear
voice.
